|
The United Kingdom and its empire remained officially neutral throughout the American Civil War (1861–65). It legally recognised the belligerent status of the Confederacy; it never recognized it as a nation and never signed a treaty or exchanged ambassadors. However, the top British officials debated intervention in the first 18 months. Elite opinion tended to favour the Confederacy, while public opinion tended to favour the United States. Large scale trade continued in both directions, with the Americans shipping grain to Britain while Britain sent manufactured items and munitions. Immigration continued into the U.S., with Britons volunteering for the Union Army. British trade with the Confederacy fell over 90% from prewar, with a little cotton going to Britain and some munitions slipped in by numerous small blockade runners. The blockade runners were operated and funded by British private interests; they were legal under international law and were not a cause of dispute between Washington and London. The Confederate strategy for securing independence was largely based on the hope of military intervention by Britain and France, which never happened; military intervention would have meant war with the United States. A serious diplomatic dispute with the United States erupted over the "Trent Affair" in late 1861; it was resolved peacefully in a few months. British intervention was only likely in cooperation with France, which had an imperialistic venture underway in Mexico. By early 1863, intervention was no longer seriously considered, as Britain turned her attention elsewhere, especially toward Russia and Greece.〔Niels Eichhorn, "The Intervention Crisis of 1862: A British Diplomatic Dilemma?" ''American Nineteenth Century History'' (2014) 15#2 pp 287-310.〕 A long-term issue was a British shipyard (John Laird and Sons) building two warships for the Confederacy, including the CSS ''Alabama'',〔http://www.americancivilwar.org.uk/news_css-alabama-crew-of-the-british-isles_32.htm〕 over vehement protests from the United States. This controversy, known as the Alabama Claims, was resolved after the Civil War when the United States was awarded $15.5 million in arbitration by an international tribunal for damages caused by these warships. That British private interests operated blockade runners was not a cause of serious tension. In the end, British involvement did not significantly affect the outcome of the American Civil War. The U.S. diplomatic mission headed by Minister Charles Francis Adams, Sr. proved much more successful than the Confederate missions, which were never officially recognized.〔Martin B. Duberman, ''Charles Francis Adams, 1807-1886'' (1961), p 333〕 ==Confederate policies== The Confederacy, and its president Jefferson Davis, believed from the beginning in "King Cotton"—the notion that British dependence on cotton for its large textile industry would lead to diplomatic recognition and mediation or military intervention. The Confederates had not sent out agents ahead of time to ascertain if the King Cotton policy would be effective. Instead by popular demand (not government action) shipments of cotton to Europe were ended in spring 1861. When the Confederate diplomats did arrive they tried to convince British leaders that the American naval blockade was an illegal paper blockade.〔Charles M. Hubbard, "James Mason, the `Confederate Lobby,' and the blockade debate of March 1862," ''Civil War History'' (1999) 45#3 pp 223-37〕 Historian Charles Hubbard writes: :"Davis left foreign policy to others in government and, rather than developing an aggressive diplomatic effort, tended to expect events to accomplish diplomatic objectives. The new president was committed to the notion that cotton would secure recognition and legitimacy from the powers of Europe. The men Davis selected as secretary of state and emissaries to Europe were chosen for political and personal reasons – not for their diplomatic potential. This was due, in part, to the belief that cotton could accomplish the Confederate objectives with little help from Confederate diplomats."〔Hubbard, ''Burden Of Confederate Diplomacy'' (2000) pg. 7〕 Hubbard adds that Davis’ policy was “a rigid and inflexible policy based on economic coercion and force. The stubborn reliance of the Confederates on a King Cotton strategy resulted in a natural resistance to coercion from the Europeans. Davis’s policy was to hold back cotton until the Europeans “came to get it.” The opinions of Secretary of War Judah Benjamin and Secretary of the Treasury Christopher Memminger that cotton should be immediately exported in order to build up foreign credits was overridden by Davis.〔 Hubbard, ''Burden Of Confederate Diplomacy'' pg. 21-25 〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「United Kingdom and the American Civil War」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
|